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BOOK
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL MEDICINE.

REVIEW
By Alan R. Moritz, M.D.t and

C. Joseph Stetler, LL.B., LL.M.-,4 Pp. 239. The C. V. Mosby Company, St. Louis, Missouri, (2d ed.) 1964. $5.75.
The 1964 edition of Handbook of Legal Medicine by Moritz and Stetler represents the revised version of the 1956 publication of the same
title by Moritz and Louis J. Regan, M.D., LL.B., the "dean" of Legal
Medicine who died in 1955, shortly before the first edition was published in 1956. Certainly, Mr. Stetler is eminently qualified to have
worked on the revised edition of this textbook, having been head of
the Law Department of the American Medical Association for many
years before assuming his present position in 1963. The other coauthor, Dr. Alan R. Moritz, was formerly Chairman of the Department of Legal Medicine at Harvard University and has been personally responsible for the training of many of the foremost forensic
pathologists in the United States today.
The Handbook of Legal Medicine is aptly titled-it is a small book;
however, just as size is not determinative of quality in human beings,
so it is with books. The authors have managed to touch upon most of
the important areas and to set forth most of the basic principles in
the broad field of Legal Medicine, although they do not purport to
cover any or all of these in a definitive fashion. The book has been
divided into two parts. Part I is entitled SCIENTIFIC MEDICOLEGAL
INVESTIGATION; Part II, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT-PHYSICIAN AND
THE LAW. (The latter section was originally prepared by Dr. Regan
and has been revised in this second edition by Mr. Stetler.) In the
preface to the second edition, the authors have attempted to differentiate between "Legal" or "Forensic Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence," a differentiation which has not always been clear, even in
the minds of practitioners and teachers in the field of Legal Medicine.
The authors define legal or forensic medicine as that subject matter
which deals with the application of medical knowledge in the administration of justice. Medical jurisprudence is defined as that body of
tProfessor of Pathology and Director of the Institute of Pathology, Western
Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.
ttExecutive Vice President and General Counsel, Pharmaceutical
facturers Association, Washington, D.C.
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knowledge which concerns the legal responsibilities of the physician,
with particular reference to those responsibilities that arise from the
physician-patient relationship.
Part I,

SCIENTIFIC MEDICOLEGAL INVESTIGATION,

deals with what

would most appropriately be classified as Forensic Pathology, Forensic Toxicology, and Forensic Immunology, These are excellent
chapters prepared by Dr. Alan R. Moritz, an acknowledged world
authority in these fields for many years. Dr. Moritz begins with a
discussion of the "Physician's Responsibilities in Cases of Death by
Violence or from Unexplained Causes" and then logically develops his
portion of the book through fourteen chapters that deal with the
determination of the identity of the dead person, time of death, and
mechanisms of various types of injuries, both nonfatal and fatal.
Specific sections are devoted to criminal acts such as homicide by
shooting and stabbing, rape, abortion, and poisoning. This material
is briefly but clearly set forth in such a way as to constitute a valuable
quick reference for physicians as well as lawyers and law students.
Almost every sentence contains a pearl of medical-legal significance
which the practitioner of medicine or law could do well in remembering. Each chapter is filled with specific examples, most of which have
been culled from the personal experiences of Dr. Moritz and his
former pupils, many of whom are now medical examiners in various
jurisdictions throughout the United States.
Specific sections have been devoted to two rapidly expanding areas
of litigation, namely "Trauma and Heart Disease" and "Trauma and
Cancer." It should be noted that both these sections are written with
the scientific objectivity of a physician more so than with the imagination and ingenuity of a plaintiff's lawyer. Dr. Moritz sets forth
rather stringent criteria and gives several reasons why he believes
the determination of a causal relationship between trauma and heart
disease or cancer can be made only in a small number of cases. Inasmuch as Dr. Moritz does not completely close the doors to these areas
of litigation, any argument with him that would be made by an
attorney or a physician would not necessarily be based on totally
divergent viewpoints of these subjects, but would more likely arise
from different nuances in a specific case. Certainly, it would be prudent for any physician to carefully review the thoughts set forth in
these sections before testifying as an expert medical witness in any
case, particularly in cases involving heart disease or cancer following
trauma. Although Dr. Moritz has established excellent guidelines,
they should not be too rigidly adhered to. The individual physician
should feel free to add his own beliefs and opinions based upon his
personal knowledge in a specific case.
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Apparently, the limitations of space of this Handbook prevented
the authors from embarking upon an elaboration of the highly interesting and more frequently litigated areas involving heart disease
and cancer-namely, whether prolonged emotional stress following
an accident can cause an individual with pre-existing arteriosclerotic
cardiovascular disease to later develop a coronary occlusion, and
whether trauma can aggravate and accelerate the growth of a preexisting quiescent and asymptomatic malignant tumor. These questions arise more frequently in the civil courts and in workmen's
compensation hearings and pose less of a problem for the physician
from the standpoint of establishing causal relationship. Hopefully,
these questions will be more elaborately discussed in the next edition
of the Handbook of Legal Medicine.
Special mention should be made of a very fine chapter on Forensic
Toxicology which includes a discussion of most of the toxic compounds that are involved in accidental, suicidal or homicidal poisonings in the United States today. The authors, in fact, feel that the
materials covered in this chapter account "for well over 95% of all
deaths from poisoning in the United States" (p. 82). This chapter
was written in association with Irving Sunshine, Ph.D., Chief Forensic Toxicologist in the Office of the Coroner, Cuyahoga County,
Cleveland, Ohio.
Another excellent chapter, entitled "Medical-Legal Aspects of
the Individuality of the Blood," was written by Roger W. Marsters,
Ph.D., Assistant Professor in the Department of Pathology at
Western Reserve University and Director of the Blood Bank at the
Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital. In a limited amount of
space, Dr. Marsters has very clearly set forth all the basic concepts
involved in Forensic Immunology, as it is applied to paternity cases,
identification of lost babies, United States Immigration Service cases,
and criminal cases such as rape and homicide. Indeed, a highly complex subject which often puzzles many physicians as well as attorneys
has been masterfully handled by Dr. Marsters.
Part H of this textbook is set forth in alphabetical order with most
of the important areas of medical jurisprudence covered. The chapters
begin with "Abortion" and "Adoption" and end with "Workmen's
Compensation" and "Wrongful Death Actions." There are forty-one
such chapters, each containing the basic tenets of the particular subject being covered.
To a large extent, Mr. Stetler has understandably emphasized the
role of the physician in the administration of justice and has dwelt on
those areas of the law which affect the physician's daily practice of
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medicine, both in his office and in the hospital. Lest this statement
cause the law student and lawyer to shy away from the book on the
assumption that it is valuable only for physicians, it should be
remembered that approximately 50 to 85% of all civil cases (according to the authors) involve medical facts, analyses, and opinions
(p. 187). Thus, it is safe to say that what is important to the physician as far as medical jurisprudence is concerned is even more
important to the lawyer whose livelihood depends in part or in toto
on personal injury actions.
Apropos this subject, Mr. Stetler has a valuable chapter entitled
"The Medical Witness and his Testimony," which admirably covers
most of the problems that confront the medical expert witness and
the attorney in personal injury cases from the standpoint of determining damages. With all due respect to the learned members of the
trial bar and the judges who sit at trial level, this chapter is particularly recommended to them. Mr. Stetler clearly sets forth the necessity and propriety of the utilization by the medical expert witness of
diagrams, X-rays, skeletons, and other models when properly introduced by counsel. One cannot help but believe (perhaps with naive
optimism) that many attorneys and judges, who immediately become
fearful and disturbed when plaintiff's counsel comes forth with a
medical sketch or model, would perhaps be less resentful if they
were aware that the former head of the Law Department of the
American Medical Association, and one of the foremost teachers of
Legal Medicine and Forensic Pathology in the country today, both
believe the introduction and utilization of such materials is proper
and effective.
In another chapter, "Physician Reports," Mr. Stetler and Dr. Moritz
have set forth a fine two-page outline for a medical report form, which
is recommended for the physician who is asked to submit a report to
the attorney or to the court in a personal injury action. There is no
doubt that if this particular form were adhered to by treating
physicians, many of the problems that befall the trial courts today
would be markedly diminished. Moreover, the problem of physicians'
reports is brought up again as one of forty-two sets of questions and
answers outlined by the authors dealing with various areas of medical
jurisprudence. The question-"Does a physician owe a patient a duty
to aid him in the event of litigation ?" The answer-"Yes, and this includes, when necessary, rendering reports, attending court, and
refusing affirmative assistance to the patient's antagonist in the
litigation" (p. 179). Many physicians may not be fully cognizant of
the existence or the extent of this duty, but there is no hesitation in
the minds of medical-legal authorities as to the necessity and duty
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of a physician to submit a complete medical report to the attorney
when so requested and upon receipt of proper authorization by the
patient-client. The authors cite Alexander v. Knight' as the authority
for the question and answer set forth above.
The twenty-six chapters prepared by Mr. Stetler, however, are not
limited to medical professional liability and medical expert testimony
in personal injury litigation. The author has also included many
other important, albeit less frequently litigated, medical-legal problems such as narcotics, insanity, dying declarations, the right to
practice in a hospital, membership in medical societies, medical
licensure, and medical practice arrangements such as partnerships
and corporations. Something that will be appreciated by all law
students and practicing attorneys particularly is a rundown of the
limitation periods in each of the fifty states for actions in tort, contract, and wrongful death.
A short but highly selective bibliography can also be found at the
end of the book, along with a glossary of many of the most commonly
used legal and medical words in those areas in which law and
medicine meet.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the Handbook of Legal
Medicine is nothing more than what it purports to be-a handbook
of legal medicine. Although it is extremely well written and covers in
concise fashion most of the important areas of Legal Medicine and
Medical Jurisprudence, it cannot be considered as a large reference
work by the serious student of Forensic Medicine, or for that matter
by the physician and attorney whose daily practice requires highly
detailed knowledge of the field. With this in mind, the reviewer would
like to direct the reader's attention to Doctor and Patient and the
Law2 , one of the selected references listed by the authors. The reviewer heartily recommends this book as a more definitive work,
although it does not contain any of the important areas of Forensic
Pathology, a subject with which the attorney doing civil or criminal
work must be familiar. For this purpose, another of the books listed
under selected references, Legal Medicine3 , is particularly recommended by the reviewer.
In view of the importance of medical testimony and medical reports
in a high percentage of the criminal cases in our courts, the reviewer
1. 197 Pa. Super. 79, affirming on the opinion of a lower court reported at
25 Pa. D. & C. 2d, 649, 655; 177 A.2d 142, 146 (1962).
2. Stetler & Moritz, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW (St. Louis, C. V.
Mosby Co., 1962).
3. Gonzales, Vance, Halpern & Umberger, LEGAL MEDICINE (New York
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954).
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would be remiss if he did not call attention to the fact that the
authors of the Handbook of Legal Medicine emphasize the necessity
of having competent medicolegal investigation in all cases of suspicious, unexpected and unexplained deaths. In their words, "Between
15 and 20% of all deaths that occur in the United States result either
from violence of one kind or another, or occur unexpectedly from
unexplained but presumably natural causes. If the Office of the
Coroner is to discharge the functions for which it was intended, all
such deaths should be reported to it. That the Office should have authority and competence to secure complete and reliable medical facts
pertaining to such deaths is obvious" (p. 16). The authors go on to
cite many examples in which homicide has masqueraded as natural
death or suicide and vice versa. Indeed, without reiterating this point
verbatim, the authors nevertheless re-emphasize the principle many
times in their book. This emphasis can be inferred by the frequent
references to the correct and uniform application of scientific principles in the administration of justice in both the civil and criminal
courts.
If the authors had accomplished no other objective in their book
than to set forth this highly important concept, the book would be
considered a "must" for the library of every attorney and physician.
Of course, they have done far more than this, and thus have
made their Handbook of Legal Medicine a very practical and handy
little book to have around.
Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., LL.B.*

SOCIALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Bernard
A. Ramundot with the assistance of Armins Rusis.,: Pp. iv, 108.
Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University
Press, Washington, D.C., 1964. $1.75.

THE (SOVIET)

This work represents a very welcome addition to the existing corpus
of literature concerning Soviet conceptions of international law. The
authors have admirably succeeded in illustrating the seemingly perennial dilemma of the Soviet specialist in international law: reconciling
*Assistant District Attorney and Medical-Legal Advisor to the District Attorney of Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
tLt. Col., Chief of Status of Forces Branch, International Affairs Division,
Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army; Lecturer In Soviet Law at
the Law School, George Washington University; LL.B., Columbia University.
tMember of the Staff, European Law Division, Library of Congress; Doctor
of Jurisprudence, UNRRA University, Munich.
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the theoretical and often incompatible premises of Soviet Marxism
with the exigencies of Soviet external policy. This dilemma is aptly
described as follows: "There is great danger for the theoretician
in a system which is torn between orthodoxy and practical need.
The Soviet international legal specialist, charged with combining the
frequently incompatible elements of Marxism-Leninism and Soviet
foreign policy needs, must be especially nimble or penitent to avoid
the pitfalls reserved for those who support the old party line" (p. 11).
In this context, the authors' concluding assessment of the postStalinist, posthumous rehabilitation of Pashukanis and the resuscitation of certain of his international legal theorems is most impressive.
Three especially noteworthy features of this manuscript are:
(1) The style-or to employ the vernacular of contemporary American Political Science-the methodological approach. Coupling a brief
but analytically incisive commentary with a prolific employment of
primary and secondary sources, the authors succeed in presenting
a highly objective appraisal of the subject matter involved. This is
commendable in an era in which texts are often characterized by
excessive commentary and a paucity of documentation. (2) Brief
but excellent summaries of some of the major doctrinal contradictions which presently plague Soviet conceptualizations concerning
international law: the role of the class struggle; relationship between
Unterbau (economic substructure) and Oberbau (societal superstructure) in ascertaining the existence of a general international law; the
ultimate determinant of norm-formulation in the relationships existent among states in the international community; and the sometimes
facile rationalizations encountered in Soviet attempts to explain the
correlation between a general and a socialist international law, among
others. (3) Superior treatment of the centrality of the "doctrine" of
peaceful coexistence in current Soviet versions of international law;
the international legal implications of certain aspects of the polemics
involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute; the role of the "third world"
("unaligned" nations within the Afro-Asian bloc) in contemporary
Soviet international law; Soviet interpretations of the role of international law--or more correctly, the absence thereof-during the
"final victory and consolidation of socialism in the world arena."
These particular passages should prove fruitful for the serious student of Soviet foreign policy as well as the individual specializing in
Soviet interpretations of international law.
Hopefully, this work could perhaps have devoted greater attention
to the essentially practical and political factors underlying the fiat
addressed to Soviet international legal specialists: "provide a legal
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basis for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the socialist
camp" (p. 57); however, in sum, it constitutes a notable contribution to the study of international law, and in a broader context, the
discipline of Soviet Studies.
Robert E. Beranek*

LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY.

By H. L. A. Hart.t Pp. 88. Stanford

University Press, Stanford, California, 1963. $3.00.
Professor Hart's little book represents the publication of a series
of three lectures given in 1962 under the Harry Camp Memorial
Fund, established in 1959 to make possible a continuing series of
lectures at Stanford University on topics bearing on the dignity and
worth of the human individual. The apt topic selected is one aspect
of the relationship between law and morals: whether the legal enforcement of morality is itself moral. Professor Hart states that
four questions may be distinguished regarding the subject. The
historical and causal question: Has the development of the law been
influenced by morals? The analytical or definitional question: Must
some reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law
or legal system? A third question concerns the possibility and the
forms of the moral criticism of law: Is law open to moral criticism?
It is to a fourth question that the lectures are addressed.
The fourth question may be stated in a number of ways: "Is the
fact that certain conduct is by common standards immoral sufficient
to justify making that conduct punishable by law? Is it morally
permissible to enforce morality as such? Ought immorality as such
to be a crime?" (p. 4). Professor Hart's answer is negative. The
basis for his argument is to be found in two uncompromising assumptions which, with forensic artistry, are most clearly established in the
conclusion to the lectures. The author states that he has "from the
beginning assumed that anyone who raises, or is willing to debate, the
question whether it is justifiable to enforce morality, accepts the view
that the actual institutions of any society, including its positive
morality, are open to criticism" (p. 81). Further, Professor Hart concludes, "I have also assumed from the beginning that anyone who regards this question as open to discussion necessarily accepts the critical principle, central to all morality, that human misery and the re*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Duquesne University.
tProfessor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University;
Stanford University, 1962.

Harry Camp

Lecturer,
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striction of freedom are evils; for that is why the legal enforcement of morality calls for justification" (p. 82).
The starting point for Professor Hart's position is to be found in
John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty:
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community against
his will is to prevent harm to others.... His own good either
physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forebear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or
even right' (p. 4).
Although he does not claim to defend Mill in all applications of the
foregoing statement, Professor Hart finds that "on the narrower
issue relevant to the enforcement of morality Mill seems to me to
be right" (p. 5). The main focus of Professor Hart's argument is
upon the legal enforcement of sexual morality where "it seems
prima facie plausible that there are actions immoral by accepted
standards and yet not harmful to others" (p. 5). More particularly,
the object of these lectures is to show that when transgressions
against sexual morality committed privately by consenting adults
inflict no harm upon society collectively or upon its individual members, they should not be made the subject of criminal sanctions. The
general evaluation of such mis-use of legal measures is that there
is no moral justification for the legal enforcement of morality in
such cases. Professor Hart claims corroboration for his views in
the treatment of homosexual practices in private between consenting
adults and prostitution by the Wolfenden Committee and its statement in section 61 of the Report: "There must remain a realm of
private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms,
not the law's business 2 "' (p. 14). Similar opinions are cited from
the draft Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute 3 (p 15).
The opposite conception of the function of the criminal law Professor Hart finds embodied in the "legal moralism" of the decision
of the House of Lords in the famous Ladies Directory case. 4 Although there were two specific criminal charges for which Shaw was
found guilty, a third was also sustained, that of conspiring to cor1.

ON LIBERTY, Chapter 1.

2. Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution
(CMD 247) 1957.
3. MODEL PENAL CODE, p. 277-78 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
4. Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions. (1961) 2 All E.R. 446.
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rupt public morals by means of the "Ladies Directory". Accordingly, there was reasserted on behalf of the Courts the role of custos
morum of the people and the superintendency of offenses contra
bonos mores. Professor Hart sees here a resemblance to the criminal
laws of Nazi Germany and assails the disregard of certainty and the
possibility of extension of what Bentham a would have termed "ex
post facto law" as offensive to the traditional principle of legality
in the criminal law (p. 12). It is one of the many merits of Professor Hart's analysis that the occasion of possible abuses is exposed.
In speaking of American dead letter legislation against sexual immorality, he says: "No one, I think, should contemplate this situation with complacency, for in combination with inadequate published
statistics the existence of criminal laws which are generally not
enforced places formidable discriminatory powers in the hands of
the police and prosecuting authorities" (p. 27). Examples of abuses
of the criminal law abound in the history of Nazi Germany and elsewhere. That they share the same general categories with Professor
Hart's observations about our own enforcement of morality does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that they are to be equated or that
such is a predictable trend.
In order fully to appreciate Professor Hart's argument generally,
and with regard to the examples to which he addresses himself
specially, one should observe the distinction he makes between
"positive" and "critical" morality. The former term refers to "the
morality actually accepted and shared by a social group" (p. 20);
the latter refers to "the general moral principles used in the criticism
of actual social institutions including positive morality" (p. 20).
Therefore, upon the basis of critical principles identified above,
Professor Hart is criticizing the practice of one social institution
(law) in enforcing conformity with another social institution
(morality). It follows, so goes the argument, that if the central
value to be preserved is the liberty of the individual, then we are
faced with the need to establish a standard for competing values in
order to justify any restriction of that liberty.
Professor Hart also notes the distinction between enforcement as
punishment for committed crimes and enforcement as coercion
against the commission of crimes because of fear of punishment.
One might ask whether the creation of "misery of a quite special
degree" (p. 22), effected by the coercion of criminal prohibitions
against practices considered by society to be immoral, even unnatural, is not justified by the establishment of moral values in the
form of an institutionalized statement of shared minimal concepts
5.

PRINCIPLES OF THE CML CODE,

WORKS 326).

Part I, Chapter 17 (I[Bowring ed.]
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of morality and the prediction that violations will be treated in
an indicated manner. To this Professor Hart would say no, unless
the practice objected to has a victim or its prohibition is justified by
some other reason than that it is immoral.
The concept of harm could have been treated with more attention
to the definitional and functional limits of the term here. Is Professor
Hart speaking only of physical damage, or physical discomfort, or
physical and psychological discomfort, or physical and psychological damage? Professor Hart concedes that "there may be grounds
justifying the legal coercion of the individual other than the prevention of harm to others" (p. 5). He cites as "other grounds" the
paternalism of not admitting the consent of the victim in defense
to a charge of murder or deliberate assault; the nuisance theory for
punishing the bigamist; the affront to public decency theory for
punishing for behavior in public which is unobjectionable if carried
on in private. It may be argued that the enforcement of morality is
at the core of prohibiting these practices and that to recognize the
usefulness of criminal laws in these areas only upon nonmoral
grounds is perhaps to refuse to accept the inseparable quality of
a number of interacting social values. Hence by Professor Hart's
own argument the examples of the enforcement of morality as such
are few, and one finds that Professor Hart's dialectic is being used
as a special pleading for needed reform in our laws regarding homosexual practices.
Recent movements for reforms in the administration of the
criminal law may be said to make use of the distinction Professor
Hart points out between "What sort of conduct may be justifiably
punished?" and "How severely should we punish different offenses?"
(p. 36). Modern penology continues to seek more appropriate and
humane practices in the treatment of offenders, particularly those
offending against sexual morality. This is especially true when
there is a disturbed state of mind in the offender. Certainly the life
of the offender should not be blighted by treatment and notoriety
which secure no reasonable interest of society.
Professor Hart identifies a moderate and an extreme thesis among
advocates of the enforcement of morality by the criminal law.
The former, generally espoused by Lord Devlin, 6 considers shared
morality to be of instrumental value in the preservation of society.
It then follows that "society may use the law to preserve its morality
as it uses it to safeguard anything else essential to its existence"
(p. 49). On the other hand, the extreme thesis, identified with James
6.

The Enforcement of Morals, Oxford University Press, 1959.
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Fitzjames Stephen, 7 finds in the enforcement of morals as such an
absolute value: "Instead, the enforcement of morality is regarded
as a thing of value, even if immoral acts harm no one directly, or indirectly by weakening the moral cement of society" (p. 49). The
following may illustrate the clarity of Professor Hart's categorical
approach to this aspect of the problem:
Perhaps the clearest way of distinguishing these two
theses is to see that there are always two levels at which we
may ask whether some breach of positive morality is harmful. We may ask first, Does this act harm anyone independently of its repercussion on the shared morality of
society? And secondly we may ask, Does this act affect the
shared morality and thereby weaken society? The moderate
thesis requires, if the punishment of the act is to be justified,
an affirmative answer at least at the second level. The extreme thesis does not require an affirmative answer at either
level (p. 49).
Society, however, does not seem to act with the analytical acumen
of the logician and the philosopher, and the law must generally be
content to rely more upon experience than upon logic. The problem
here is as to which more truly is an expression of reason at a given
moment. Neat distinctions are probably lost when society considers
that certain behavior, whether carried on in public or private, whether
painful or not, corrupts persons exposed to its publication. Is this
harm not justifiably avoided by the use of legal prohibitions?
Professor Hart adds elsewhere that any analysis of democratic
government must be attentive to distinguish "the acceptable principle that political power is best entrusted to the majority from the
unacceptable claim that what the majority do with that power is
beyond criticism and must never be resisted" (p. 79).
Although he doubts that there is presently much empirical evidence, Professor Hart admits the possibility that, "if deviations
from conventional sexual morality are tolerated by the law and
come to be well known, the conventional morality might change in
We should compare such a development
a permissive direction ....
not to the violent overthrow of government but to a peaceful constitutional change in its form, consistent not only with the preservation of a society but with its advance" (p. 52).
The term morality, that which is called positive morality here, is
not easy of definition, especially in language which will express the
shared expectations of a pluralistic society. It is the tenuous con7.

LIBERTY, EQUALITY. FRATERNITY, (2d ed.)

London 1874.
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sensus regarding the exercise of morality today which Professor
Hart cites as the empirical basis for making so fixed a distinction
between positive and critical morality. Earlier he has observed,
"Plainly the adequacy of Utilitarianism as a moral critique of social
institutions is in issue here" (p. 4). There is thus implicit as a
-corollary to Professor Hart's critical principle that positive morality
is open to the criticism, the notion that no precept thereof is to be
preserved for its own sake. Now, after all, we reach the impasse between exponents of those "grand but vague" words "Positivism" and
"Natural Law" which symbolizes the fundamental difficulty in legal
philosophy, that of harmonizing the is and the ought in the relation
between law and morality. Elsewhere Professor Hart questions that
"we could ascribe to all social morality the status which theological
systems or the doctrine of the Law of Nature ascribes to some fundamental principles" (p. 72). Not all, perhaps, but in a book so
positively concerned with the dignity and worth of the individual it
is notable that the main use which man can make of the law is to
pursue a variety of changing values.
It is beyond the scope of this review to examine the content of
Professor Hart's jurisprudence. To expect to find a full explanation
of that jurisprudence in a book of eighty pages is to ask too much
and to be blinded to the real accomplishment of these lectures. Certainly Law, Liberty and Morality should lead the interested reader
to Professor Hart's other writings, as well as those of others who
have allied with him or opposed him. There is presented in this
"slim volume" an admirably clear exposition and analysis of the
elements and significance of the problem. Whether or not one agrees
with Professor Hart's premises and conclusions, one cannot fail to be
instructed by the method of his analysis and benefit from the need to
re-examine one's own position in the light of Professor Hart's contribution.
Robert L. Felix*
*Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.

